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INTRODUCTION

The area of insurance law developed significantly during the
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Survey year. The cases decided encompassed a variety of important issues. The Survey year included, for example, a definition of
the scope of bodily injury coverage in the toxic tort field. On a
more familiar level, the courts discussed the approaches to both
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. Additionally, the
legislature offered insurance coverage protection to two previously
disadvantaged groups - spouses of deceased wage-earners and divorced homemakers.
II.
A.

THE INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND AND INDEMNIFY

Toxic Tort Litigation: The Triggering of Coverage

Because of the multitude of asbestos-related claims affecting millions of dollars of insurance coverage,' the need to determine when
asbestos-related diseases triggered insurance coverage became of
tantamount importance. The Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District addressed this issue in Zurich Insurance Co. v. Raymark
Industries,Inc. 2 The court held that coverage was initiated by exposure to asbestos or by manifestation of a diagnosable asbestosrelated disease.3 Additionally, the court defined the scope of an
insurer's duty to defend once policy limits are exhausted. The Zurich court decided that under the policies at issue, an insurer's duty
to defend a claim against its insured ceased when the indemnity
limit of the policy had been reached.4
Raymark Industries, Inc., one of the defendants in Zurich, has
been named as a defendant in a multitude of asbestos products liability actions. 5 Over the span of years that it manufactured asbestos products, 6 Raymark had been insured by various insurance
companies under several comprehensive general liability policies.7
1. See infra note 5 and accompanying text.
2. 145 Ill. App. 3d 175, 494 N.E.2d 634 (1st Dist. 1986).
3. Id. at 190, 494 N.E.2d at 643. Asbestos-related diseases include asbestosis,
mesothelioma, and bronchogenia carcinoma. Id.
4. Id. at 196, 494 N.E.2d at 647.
5. Id. at 180, 494 N.E.2d at 637. Over the last several years, approximately 25,000
claimants have filed suits against Raymark, alleging injuries related to asbestos exposure.
Id.
6. The underlying claims alleged exposure to asbestos during the 1940's, 1950's, and
1960's, the span of years during which Raymark manufactured asbestos products. Id.
7. Id. at 180, 494 N.E.2d at 637. The insurance companies and their periods of coverage were as follows: May 1, 1941 to May 1, 1945 and February 4, 1947 to February 4,
1950 - Commercial Union Insurance Company; February 1950 to September 1951 Globe Indemnity Company; September 26, 1951 to September 1967 - Federal Insurance
Company; September 1967 to October 15, 1969 - Commercial Union; and October 15,
1969 to the present - Zurich Insurance Company. Raymark also had been covered by
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Because of the number of claims and insurers involved, Zurich Insurance Company, one of Raymark's insurers, filed a declaratory
judgment action to determine questions of coverage and defense
obligations for the actions filed against Raymark. s The coverage
provisions of the policies involved were nearly identical in language, providing for the insurer to pay "all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily
injury . . . caused by an occurrence .

. .. "9

The policies defined

"bodily injury" to include "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by any person." 1
The time at which a "bodily injury" had occurred due to asbestos-related disease was at issue in Zurich because such a disease
often fails to manifest itself until several years after exposure to
asbestos. Zurich, Raymark, and Raymark's other insurers advanced three different theories to determine when coverage was
triggered: the exposure theory, the manifestation theory, and the
Keene theory. "
Under the exposure theory, coverage of asbestos claims depends
solely on the individual claimant's period of active exposure to asbestos. This theory provides that all insurers whose policies were
in effect during the exposure period share any indemnity and defense obligations pro rata.I2 Medical evidence establishing that tissue damage occurs shortly after 3inhalation of asbestos fibers
supports application of this theory.'
Under the second theory, the manifestation theory, an insurer's
coverage and defense obligations are triggered only by a medically
detectable and diagnosable "bodily injury."' 14 As a result, coverage
would not begin until an individual developed some recognizable
signs of an asbestos-related disease. 5
policies of excess insurance issued by Northbrook Excess & Surplus Insurance Company
since 1976. Id.
8. Id. at 180-81, 494 N.E.2d at 637.
9. Id. at 181, 494 N.E.2d at 638.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. The exposure theory has been adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Insurance Co.
of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, 633 F.2d 1212 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1109 (1981); the Fifth Circuit in Porter v. American Optical Corp., 641 F.2d 1128
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981); and the Eleventh Circuit in Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543 (1lth Cir. 1985).
13. Id. at 189, 494 N.E.2d at 643. The exposure theory was advanced by Zurich and
Northbrook. Id.
14. Id. at 182, 494 N.E.2d at 638. The manifestation theory was advanced by Commercial Union and Federal. Id.
15. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit adopted the manifes-
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The third theory provides that coverage for an insured commences with the first inhalation of asbestos and continues through
both the exposure and clinical manifestation stages of an asbestosrelated disease.1 6 Based on Keene Corp.v. Insurance Co. of North
America,17 this theory has come to be known as the Keene, hybrid,
or triple trigger theory.II The Keene approach provides an insured
with the maximum coverage because policies in effect only during
the latent period of an asbestos-related disease are triggered in addition to policies in effect at the time of exposure and
manifestation. 19
During the Zurich trial, the parties called both pathologists and
clinicians to define the terms "injury" and "disease." The pathologists defined "injury" as "an alteration of structure and function of
a cell, tissue or organ."2 Accordingly, the pathologists viewed asbestos-related diseases as a process beginning with inhalation and
continuing through manifestation.21 The clinicians, however, testified that an "injury" required a noticeable harm.22 The clinicians
concluded that because the body's defenses appear to negate effectively the harmful effects of asbestos for varied periods of time, a
"disease" does not occur until it can be diagnosed.2 3 Based upon
this evidence and the policy provisions, the trial court held that
coverage should be provided if an insurer's policy was in effect
either during the claimant's exposure period or when an asbestosrelated disease manifested itself in the claimant, but not if the policy was in effect only during the period after a claimant was extation theory in Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1028 (1983).
16. Zurich, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 182, 494 N.E.2d at 638. Only Raymark advanced the
hybrid theory. Id. See infra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
17. 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982). Keene Corporation manufactured asbestos and sought a declaratory judgment of its rights and obligations under several comprehensive general liability policies issued to it. The court held
that coverage was triggered by inhalation exposure, exposure in residence, and manifestation. Id. at 1047.
18. Zurich, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 182, 190, 494 N.E.2d at 638-39.
19. Id. at 182, 494 N.E.2d at 638. For example, under the Keene theory, if an individual was first exposed to asbestos in 1970 but did not manifest any disease until 1975, a
policy effective from 1971 to 1974 would be triggered. The Keene theory was adopted by
the Third Circuit in AC and S,Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 764 F.2d 968 (3d Cir.
1985). Accord Lac d'Amiante du Quebec, Ltee v. American Home Assurance Co., 613 F.
Supp. 1549 (D.C. N.J. 1975).
20. Zurich, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 183, 494 N.E.2d at 639.
21. Id. at 184, 494 N.E.2d at 639.
22. Id. at 183, 494 N.E.2d at 639.
23. Id. at 183-86, 494 N.E.2d at 639-41.
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posed but before an asbestos disease manifested itself.24 Thus, the
trial court adopted both the exposure and manifestation theories,
but rejected the Keene or hybrid approach.
In affirming the trial court's ruling, the appellate court noted at
the outset that because of the disjunctive language of the policy
provisions, coverage could be commenced by "bodily injury," "disease," or "sickness." 25 Because asbestos caused damage at the cellular level immediately after inhalation, the court reasoned that a
"bodily injury" had occurred, triggering coverage.26 In addition,
the court concluded that the fact that the damage was "subclinical
and require[d] medical research to verify d[id] not detract from the
fact that a real injury [had] occur[red]. 27
The Zurich court upheld manifestation as a triggering event because manifestation clearly fell within the plain meaning of "disease. '"28 Furthermore, the court noted that coverage could be
triggered before an asbestos disorder occurred if the individual suffered from a "weakened or disordered condition" because such a
condition would fall within the plain meaning of the term
"sickness."29
The court rejected the Keene approach for two reasons. First,
the court determined that the medical evidence failed to support
the finding that injury always occurs in the absence of exposure.3"
In addition, the Keene court had not relied on medical evidence in
reaching its decision, but rather had concluded that the terms
"bodily injury," "disease," and "sickness" were ambiguous and
could not be used to determine the events triggering coverage.31
Consequently, the Keene court utilized the "reasonable expectations" doctrine in making its determination, construing the insurance policies to effect the reasonable expectations of the insured.32
24. Id. at 186, 494 N.E.2d at 641.
25. Id. at 187-88, 494 N.E.2d at 642.
26. Id. at 187, 494 N.E.2d at 642. The evidence presented at trial established that
asbestos fibers caused physical damage to cells in the lung within hours of inhalation.
The body's apparent ability to repair the initial damage proved irrelevant to the court's
determination of coverage. Thus, the court dismissed Commercial Union's and Federal's
"manifestation-only" argument that one could not determine when a "disease" had commenced because the body repaired itself. Id. at 188-90, 494 N.E.2d at 642-43.
27. Id. at 189, 494 N.E.2d at 643.
28. Id. at 190, 494 N.E.2d at 644.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 191, 494 N.E.2d at 644. The Zurich court noted that no evidence had been
presented to show that a new injury always occurred in the absence of exposure to asbestos. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 191-92, 494 N.E.2d at 645. The "reasonable expectations" doctrine pro-

610
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Illinois, however, does not recognize this doctrine.33
Having determined when coverage was triggered, the appellate
court in Zurich addressed when the insurers' duty to defend
ceased. The court held that the policy provisions clearly established that no duty to defend existed after the policy limits had
been exhausted.34
Finally, the court rejected Zurich's argument that all insurers
share indemnity payments and defense costs pro rata determined
by the insurer's period of coverage in relation to the total period of
exposure. 35 Based on the policy language, the court held each carrier independently liable to Raymark for the full costs of defense
and indemnity, thus leaving the insurers to determine their share of
contribution among themselves.3 6 The court reasoned that the insurers' right to contribution should not affect their duty to their
insured.37
The Zurich opinion is significant because of the number of cases
and amount of money involved.38 More importantly, however, this
case represents the first time that an Illinois appellate court has
defined the scope of coverage in bodily injury toxic tort cases. By
rejecting the Keene theory, however, the Zurich court's holding
has invited further litigation in this area. Its rejection of the Keene
theory leaves a potential gap in the coverage between the years of
exposure and the time when the disease manifests itself. As a practical matter, this gap may coincide with the insured's maximum
coverage. Moreover, it is conceptually difficult to understand how
a bodily injury can occur during exposure but not again until
manifestation.
vides that the "objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though a
painstaking study of the policy provisions would have negated these expectations."
Keene, 667 F.2d at 1042 n.12.
33. Zurich, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 192, 494 N.E.2d at 645. Accord Bain v. Benefit Trust
Life Ins. Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 463 N.E.2d 1082 (5th Dist. 1984); Insurance Company of North America v. Adkisson, 121 Ill. App. 3d 224, 459 N.E.2d 310 (3d Dist.
1984).
34. Zurich, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 193, 494 N.E.2d at 645-46. The insuring agreements
of the policy specifically were made subject to the limits of liability, and thus the duty to
defend was linked to the indemnity limits. Id.
35. Id. at 200, 494 N.E.2d at 650. For a criticism of this pro rata approach, see
Sandoz, Inc. v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., 554 F. Supp. 257 (D.C. N.J. 1983).
36. Zurich, 145 I11.App. 3d at 200-01, 494 N.E.2d at 650-51.
37. Id.
38. See Zurich Ins. Co.v. Raymark, Inc., No. 78 L 8760 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County
August 1, 1986). The order indicates that approximately 30,000 cases have been filed
against Raymark, with an average of 900 filings per month over the past year. Id. To
date, millions of dollars have been expended in the defense of these claims.
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The Zurich holding that the duty to defend terminates upon exhaustion of policy limits also is important because it applies to policies issued both before and after 1966. In 1966, the standard form
policy added this termination limitation on the duty to defend.3 9
Most courts interpreted this revision as an indication that the pre1966 policies were designed to provide a defense obligation even
after limits were exhausted. 4° The Zurich court held that the duty
to defend did not exist in cases filed after limits were exhausted and
that affected insurers could withdraw their defense of such pending
cases. The court reasoned that an insurer could not be expected to
defend when it had no indemnity money at stake. Many prior decisions had held that the duty to defend was separate and independent of the duty to indemnify. This aspect of the opinion, if
not reversed, represents a major victory for the insurance industry
by eliminating potential financial obligations on the part of
insurers.
B.

Manufacturer'sLiability Insurance

During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District confronted the issue of whether a manufacturer's general
liability policy extends coverage to claims against the insured for
property damage to the insured's own product. The court in Great
Southwest Fire Insurance Co. v. Greenlee4' applied the recent decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Western Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Brochu 42 and held that coverage did not extend to claims
arising from damage to the insured's own product or work.43
In Greenlee, the insurer, Great Southwest, sought a declaration
of its obligation to defend and indemnify its insured, Greenlee."
The underlying plaintiffs sought recovery against Greenlee for the
collapse of grain storage bins that Greenlee had constructed and
installed.45 The complaint alleged that the bins had collapsed and
were extensively damaged.46
The appellate court granted summary judgment for Great
39.

Zulkey & Pollard, The Duty to Defend After Exhaustion of Policy Limits, 27 FOR
21, 22 (1985).
For a discussion and review of the insurer's duty to defend after exhaustion of
limits, see generally Zulkey & Pollard, supra note 39, and cases cited therein.
134 Ill. App. 3d 816, 481 N.E.2d 28 (1st Dist. 1985).
105 Ill. 2d 486, 475 N.E.2d 872 (1985).
Greenlee, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 821, 481 N.E.2d at 31.
Id. at 817, 481 N.E.2d at 28.
Id.
Id. at 817, 481 N.E.2d at 29.

THE DEFENSE

40.
policy
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
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Southwest based on exclusions in the policy which provided that
the insurance did not apply to property damage to the insured's
own products or work. In finding that these provisions excluded
coverage of the claim, the court relied on the recent Illinois
48
Supreme Court decision in Western Casualty & Surety v. Brochu
which interpreted identical exclusions. In Brochu, the court held
that such a work product exclusion applied when the complaint
sought recovery for damage to the property itself.49 The Greenlee
court, noting that the case before it was identical to Brochu, held
that no coverage existed because the complaint sought recovery for
"damage to the property itself rather than damage resulting from
an accident caused by the bin . . . .0 Accordingly, the Greenlee
application of Brochu definitively establishes the exclusion from
coverage of damage to property which is the subject of the contract
between the insured contractor or manufacturer and the claimant.
C. The "Other Employee" Exclusion
The standard contractor's general liability policy names the contractor's employees as additional insureds. Consequently, liability
for the negligent acts of the contractor's employees falls within
coverage of the standard policy. Such coverage, however, is normally excluded for bodily injury to another employee. These exclusions, known as "other employee" or "co-employee" exclusions,
preclude insurance coverage of injuries to employees of the contractor caused by the negligence of their fellow employees. Such
injuries normally fall within the purview of the Worker's Compensation Act.5
The issue of whether the "other employee" exclusion in a contractor's comprehensive general liability policy precludes coverage
of a third-party claim brought against an employee was reviewed in
Howalt v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co..52 The Illinois Appellate
47. Id. at 817-18, 481 N.E.2d at 29. The policy provided that the insurance did not
apply:
(n) to property damage to the named insured's products arising out of such
products or any part of such products;
(o) to property damage to work performed by or on behalf of the named insured
arising out of the work or any portion thereof, or out of materials, parts or
equipment furnished in connection therewith,.

Id.
48. 105 I11.2d 486, 475 N.E.2d 872 (1985).
49. Id. at 496-97, 475 N.E.2d at 877.
50. Greenlee, 134 IlL. App. 3d at 821, 481 N.E.2d at 31.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.1 (1985).
52. 142 Ill. App. 3d 435, 491 N.E.2d 1207 (1st Dist. 1986).
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Court for the First District held that such exclusions do not preclude coverage of third-party contribution actions brought against
an employee arising from injuries to a fellow employee. 3
In Howalt, the insurer, Ohio Casualty, issued to Mozden Construction Company a liability policy with a rider extending coverage for claims against its employees, excepting those brought by
co-employees. 5 4 Howalt, an employee of Mozden Construction,
was operating a crane when the crane tipped over and struck Rory
Mozden, another employee. 5 Rory Mozden filed suit against
Howalt, the crane manufacturer, and the general contractor. The
latter two parties filed third-party contribution actions against
Mozden Construction, 56 which in turn filed a third-party contribution action against Howalt 5 7 As an employee of Mozden Construction and an additional insured under its policy, Howalt
tendered the defense of Rory Mozden's direct claim and Mozden
Construction's third-party action to Ohio Casualty. Ohio Casualty refused the tender of defense based upon the policy's "other
employee" exclusion. 9
The Howalt court determined that the "other employee" exclusion did not exclude the insurer's obligation to defend and indemnify a third-party claim for contribution, even though that claim
arose from an underlying claim involving injury to a co-employee. 6° The court noted that the language of the exclusion was
unambiguous, applying solely to a claim by one employee against
his fellow employee and not to contribution actions against the employee arising out of injury to a co-employee. 6' The court, utilizing
simple "contract construction" principles, found that the "co-employee" exclusion did not extend to contribution claims brought
against the tortfeasor-employee.62
The Howalt court, in dicta, cited with approval the New York
case of Weeks v. County of Oneida.63 Weeks concerned a general
53. Id. at 441, 491 N.E.2d at 1211.
54. Id. at 437, 491 N.E.2d at 1209.
55. Id. at 437, 491 N.E.2d at 1208.
56. Id. at 437, 491 N.E.2d at 1208-09.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 440, 491 N.E.2d at 1211. The "other employee" exclusion provided that
"the insurance afforded to such employee does not apply to bodily injury to another
employee of the same employer arising out of or in the course of his employment ....9
Id.
61. Id. at 440-41, 491 N.E.2d at 1211.
62. Id.
63. 91 A.D.2d 1165, 459 N.Y.S. 2d 334 (1983).
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liability policy which contained an exclusion eliminating coverage
for areas covered by Workmen's Compensation. The standard exclusion precluded coverage for bodily injury suffered by an employee in the course of his employment and for the employer's
obligation to indemnify another arising out of such injury.6" The
wording of this standard Workmen's Compensation exclusion predates contribution actions. The court held that the use of the
phrase "to indemnify" in the standard exclusion did not extend
indemnification to contribution actions against a plaintiff's employer.65 The Weeks court's interpretation means that coverage is
provided under both workmen's compensation and general liability
policies. While Illinois may wish to endorse Weeks, unfortunately
the Howalt opinion, involving totally different contractual principles, merely devoted three sentences in dicta to the contribution
issue, and thus, provided future support for a major revision in
insurance law.
D.

Conflict of Interest: Punitive Damages

When, in the defense of a claim, a conflict of interest exists between an insurer and its insured,66 the insured may retain independent counsel at the insurer's expense. 67 The Illinois
Appellate Court for the First District expanded the scope of such
conflict situations in Nandorfv. CNA Insurance Cos..6 The court
held that when punitive damages represent a substantial portion of
potential liability in an underlying action, an insurer's reservation
of rights as to indemnification for these damages creates a conflict
of interest between the insurer and the insured sufficient to warrant
retention of independent counsel at the insurer's expense.69
In Nandorf,CNA Insurance issued a comprehensive general liability policy to Nandorf. Pursuant to the policy, Nandorf tendered
to CNA the defense of a false imprisonment action filed against it.
CNA accepted the defense but reserved its indemnification rights
regarding any punitive damages assessed against Nandorf.70
64. Id. at 1167, 459 N.Y.S. 2d at 336.
65. Id.
66. The seminal Illinois cases treating conflicts of interest between insurer and insured are as follows: Murphy v. Urso, 88 I11. 2d 444, 430 N.E.2d 1079 (1981); Thornton
v. Paul, 74 Ill. 2d 132, 384 N.E.2d 335 (1978); and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64
Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976).
67. Thornton v. Paul, 74 I11.2d 132, 384 N.E.2d 335 (1978); Maryland Casualty Co.
v. Peppers, 64 I11. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976).
68. 134 Ill. App. 3d 134, 479 N.E.2d 988 (1st Dist. 1985).
69. Id. at 140, 479 N.E.2d at 993-94.
70. Id. at 135, 479 N.E.2d at 990.
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Nandorf contended that CNA's reservation of rights created a conflict of interest and, therefore, CNA was responsible for the attorney's fees incurred by Nandorf's retention of independent
counsel.7 1
The court held that a conflict of interest existed,72 noting that
the actions against Nandorf sought large punitive damage awards
and relatively small amounts of compensatory damages.73 Because
any punitive damage award would have fallen outside policy coverage, a finding of small compensatory damages but substantial punitive damages would have been in CNA's best interests. 74 Nandorf,
however, would have been best served by a finding of no punitive
damages because all other damages would fall under potential policy coverage.7 5 The court thus determined that the parties' interests were divergent. Accordingly, the court reasoned that CNA
lacked an incentive to defend vigorously the allegations which
would have supported an imposition of punitive damages, leaving
Nandorf with both the greater interest and risk in the litigation.76
The Nandorf court held that an insurer's reservation of rights regarding punitive damages leaves the insurer and the insured in a
conflict of interest.77
Despite the court's admonition that its holding did not imply
"that an insured [was] entitled to independent counsel whenever
punitive damages are sought in the underlying action,

' 78

the

Nandorf decision potentially leaves insurers liable for their insured's retention of independent counsel whenever a reservation of
rights regarding punitive damages is made. While the court recognized that punitive damages formed a "substantial portion of
[CNA's] potential liability,

' 79

it set forth neither guidelines nor pa-

rameters indicating when a reservation regarding punitive damages
creates a conflict. For example, the court left undecided whether
the amount of punitive damages sought should be the sole factor in
determining what is a "substantial portion" or whether the critical
factor is the amount of punitive damages relative to the potential
for compensatory damages. Without further delineation, insurers
71. Id. at 136, 479 N.E.2d at 990-91.
72. Id. at 140, 479 N.E.2d at 993.
73. Id. at 138-39, 479 N.E.2d at 992.
74. Id.
75. Id. Each claimant sought $5,000 in compensatory damages and $100,000 in punitive damages. Id. at 135, 479 N.E.2d at 990.
76. Id. at 138, 479 N.E.2d at 992.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 140, 479 N.E.2d at 993.
79. Id. at 140, 479 N.E.2d at 993-94.
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stand at risk for reimbursement of independent counsel every time
they reserve their rights to indemnification of punitive damage
awards."'
Additionally, the Nandorf decision contravenes a recent appellate court decision, Pekin Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance Co..81
The two decisions interpret differently the conflict of interest which
arises when a reservation has been made to indemnification. In Pekin, the insurer agreed to defend a claim against an additional insured but reserved its rights to any indemnification because the
policy limits had been exhausted in a settlement on behalf of a coinsured.8 2 The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District in Pekin held that although the insurer had no indemnity funds at risk
in the litigation, no conflict of interest existed. 3
Under the Pekin decision, the mere fact that an insurer's indemnity funds are not at risk in defending a claim involving punitive
damages would not create a conflict of interest.8 4 The Nandorfdecision, however, creates a potential per se conflict of interest situation each time an insurer reserves its rights to indemnification of
punitive damages.
E. Estoppel: The Prejudice Requirement
During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District determined when an insurer may be estopped from asserting a defense of noncoverage. In Economy Fire & Casualty v.
Green,85 the court held that invocation of the estoppel doctrine required a showing of prejudice by the insured.86 Moreover, the
court determined that no prejudice resulted when the insurer, accepting the defense of an action without any reservation of rights,
80. Several commentators have argued that no conflict of interest existed in Nandorf
because CNA simply had taken an erroneous position on the insurance of punitive damages. Hamilton & Smith, 75 ILL. B.J. 14 (1986). CNA had asserted that punitive damages
were not covered under Illinois law. Nandorf, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 135, 479 N.E.2d at 990.
Nandorf,however, involved punitive damages for which the insured would be held vicariously liable. Arguably, the insuring of such damages is permitted under the holding of
Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1st Dist. 1969). As
a result, the Nandorf court had no reason to decide whether a conflict of interest existed.
See generally Hamilton & Smith, supra.
81. 134 Ill. App. 3d 31, 479 N.E.2d 1078 (1st Dist. 1985). See infra notes 131-50 and
accompanying text.
82. Pekin, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 32-33, 479 N.E.2d at 1080.
83. Id. at 35, 479 N.E.2d at 1081-82.
84. Id. For a discussion of this viewpoint and the Nandorf decision, see Hamilton &
Smith, 75 ILL. B.J. 14 (1986).
85. 139 Ill. App. 3d 147, 487 N.E.2d 100 (1st Dist. 1985).
86. Id. at 151, 487 N.E.2d at 103.
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subsequently filed a declaratory action to determine coverage.8 7
In Economy Fire, the insured, Green, tendered to her insurer,
Economy Fire, the defense of a contribution claim alleging her
negligent supervision of her child."" Green's seven year-old child
had been injured when struck by a truck. 89 Economy Fire informed Green that although it would provide a defense to the contribution action, it would not defend certain allegations of the
complaint. The attorneys retained by Economy Fire entered an
appearance, and eight months later Economy Fire filed a declaratory judgment action to determine coverage.'" Green asserted that
because Economy Fire had undertaken her defense without reserving its rights to later deny coverage, Economy Fire was estopped
from asserting noncoverage. 9'
The appellate court granted summary judgment for Economy
Fire relying on Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers.92 The Economy
Fire court reaffirmed the Illinois Supreme Court holding that an
insured may be estopped from asserting noncoverage when it has
undertaken that defense of an action and prejudice to the insured
results from that undertaking. 9a The Economy Fire court observed
that the facts failed to indicate that Green had suffered any prejudice, and thus the estoppel doctrine could not be applied.
The Economy Fire decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First,
it establishes that an insured does not suffer prejudice per se when
an insurer accepts the defense of certain counts of a complaint,
rejects the defense of other counts, and later files a declaratory action to determine coverage under the complaint although the insurer had not reserved its rights to deny coverage. Secondly, it
requires a showing of prejudice to the insured prior to invoking
estoppel. Under the Economy Fire holding, the insured carries the
burden of establishing its prejudice by the insurer's actions when
attempting to invoke the estoppel doctrine.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 148, 487 N.E.2d at 101.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 150, 487 N.E:2d at 102.
91. Id.
92. 64 Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976).
93. Economy Fire, 139 Il. App. 3d at 151, 487 N.E.2d at 103 (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill. 2d 187, 195, 355 N.E.2d 24, 29 (1976)).
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OBTAINING AND CANCELLING COVERAGE

A. Misrepresentationin Application
The effect of an insured's knowledge of possible claims against it
when applying for an insurance policy was considered in Great
West Steel Industries,Ltd. v. Northbrook Insurance Co.." The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District held that no material
misrepresentation occurs when an insured fails to report on its application, circumstances which the insured does not believe constitute a possible claim against it. 95 In Great West, the insurer,
Northbrook, issued to Great West Steel Industries a professional
liability insurance policy covering engineers' errors and omissions. 96 The policy application required the insured to list any circumstances which might result in a possible claim against it. 97 In
responding to this question, Great West neglected to mention the
collapse of the roof on one of its projects. Prior to completion of
the application, the roof collapsed. 9a Another part of the roof collapsed after its completion. 99 Subsequently, two lawsuits were filed
against Great West concerning the second collapse. °° Northbrook, contending that Great West's answers to the application
questions constituted a material misrepresentation in light of the
roof collapses, refused to defend Great West.°10
The appellate court held that Great West had no knowledge of
the design defects leading to the second roof collapse because evidence demonstrated that the cause of the second collapse was unrelated to the first collapse.10 2 In addition, the Great West court
94. 138 I11. App. 3d 84, 484 N.E.2d 847 (1st Dist. 1985).
95. Id. at 93, 484 N.E.2d at 853.
96. Id. at 87, 484 N.E.2d at 849. The professional liability insurance policy provided
coverage for "any act, error or omission committed or alleged to have been committed by
the [i]nsured ... provided always that ... [t]he [i]nsured has no knowledge of such act,
error, or omission on the effective date of this Policy." Id.
97. Id. at 87-88, 484 N.E.2d at 849-50. The application included the following questions: 19A. Has any claim ever been made against the firm or against any persons named
in question #8 above? If so, state briefly the cause and nature of the claim including the
amount involved and names of the project and the claimant, the date when the claim was
made, the date the act giving rise to the claim was committed and the final disposition:
19B. Is the Applicant aware of any circumstances which may result in any claim against
him, his predecessors in business, or any of the present or past partners or officers?
No. If yes, please give full details on the same basis as 19A. Id.
Yes 98. Id. at 87, 484 N.E.2d at 849.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 88, 484 N.E.2d 850.
101. Id. A material misrepresentation is one which reasonably might have influenced
the insurer in deciding whether to accept or reject the risk. Safeway Ins. Co. v. Duran, 74
I11.App. 3d 846, 850, 393 N.E.2d 688, 691 (1st Dist. 1976).
102. Great West, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 91, 484 N.E.2d at 852.
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determined that no material misrepresentation existed because the
evidence also showed that in Great West's "professional judgment" the first roof collapse was caused by construction error
rather than design defects. 103 Because Great West was not responsible for construction, its failure to report the first roof collapse did
not constitute a material misrepresentation; in its own judgment,
the collapse was caused by construction error. Accordingly, the
court determined that Great West could not have had knowledge
of a possible claim against it."°
In a strong dissent, Justice Jiganti argued that the trial court's
finding that Great West had knowledge of a potential claim regarding the collapsed roof was not against the manifest weight of the
evidence. 10 5 He framed the issue simply as whether Great West
had knowledge of an error, noting that Great West knew certain
experts believed there had been a design defect. 11 6 Thus, Justice
Jiganti asserted that the "knowledge" provision of the policy
should be construed broadly, requiring the insured to report even
those acts, errors, or omissions which it did not believe to represent
a potential claim.1"7
The decision in Great West relaxes an insured's duty to reveal
circumstances which might constitute a possible claim against it.
The court subjectively interpreted the word "knowledge", concluding that the insured had only a duty to report those occurrences
that might constitute a claim in its own judgment. This subjective
interpretation of the word "knowledge" allows an insured to ignore any incident which, in its own judgment, does not fall within
the parameters of the application's inquiries. The result in Great
West undermines the extent to which an insurance application can
serve effectively as a measure of an applicant's potential risk
exposure.
B.

Cancellation by Substitution

In Copley v. Pekin Insurance Co.,° the Illinois Supreme Court
modified the requirements of cancellation by substitution. " The
court, implicitly rejecting the cancellation requirements set out in
103. Id.
104. Id. at 93, 484 N.E.2d at 853.
105. Id. at 95, 484 N.E.2d at 855.
106. Id. at 99, 484 N.E.2d at 857.
107. Id.
108. 111 11. 2d 76, 488 N.E.2d 1004 (1986). The old requirements had been set out
in Sizelove v. INA Ins. Co., 104 I11.App. 3d 864, 433 N.E.2d 696 (4th Dist. 1982).
109. Id. at 85, 488 N.E.2d at 1003.
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the appellate court case of Sizelove v. INA Insurance Co.,11° held
that a policy could be cancelled only by strict compliance to the
cancellation provisions of the policy itself, or by mutual consent of
the insurer and the insured. 11'
Copley, the insured, filed a claim under a multiperil insurance
policy issued by Pekin Insurance Company ("Pekin"). Pekin denied the claim, maintaining that under the doctrine of cancellation
by substitution, the policy had been cancelled.112 Meanwhile, Copley had obtained another insurance policy from Federated Mutual
Insurance Company. With Copley's consent, the agent for Federated Mutual met with Pekin's insurance agent and relayed Copley's desire to cancel the Pekin policy." 3 Federated Mutual's agent
failed, however, to either return the actual policy issued by Pekin
or tender a written release of the policy signed by Copley.' 1 4 Pekin's agent testified that he did not consider the policy cancelled
after he had met with the Federated Mutual agent.115
The supreme court in Copley held that "insurance policies, like
other contracts, may be cancelled only in accordance with the
terms of the insurance contract, or through the mutual consent of
the insurer and the insured."' 16 Applying this test, the court concluded that Copley's policy was effective at the time in question.
Copley had not cancelled under the policy terms, nor had there
been mutual consent to cancel the policy because Pekin's own
agent testified that he had not accepted Copley's cancellation." 7
The Copley decision severely restricts the application of the cancellation by substitution doctrine. Under the Copley standard, unilateral notification of an intent to cancel can no longer invoke the
doctrine. Under the old Sizelove standard, an insured's actions
could have led to cancellation if those actions disclosed an intent to
cancel. This new standard requires mutual consent; only an agree110. 104 Ill. App. 3d 864, 433 N.E.2d 695 (4th Dist. 1982). The Sizelove court set
out the following requirements:
(1) The insured must have secured substitute coverage and either acted in such
a manner as would disclose to the insurer an intent to cancel the existing coverage or requested cancellation under terms of the existing policy; or ;
(2) The insured must have secured substitute coverage and mutual consent to
cancel the existing coverage must exist between the insured and the insurer.
Id. at 868, 433 N.E.2d at 698.
111. Copley, 111 Ill. 2d at 85, 488 N.E.2d at 1008.
112. Id. at 78, 488 N.E.2d at 1005.
113. Id. at 80, 488 N.E.2d at 1006.
114. Id. at 85, 488 N.E.2d at 1008.
115. Id. at 80, 488 N.E.2d at 1006.
116. Id. at 85, 488 N.E.2d at 1008.
117. Id. at 86, 488 N.E.2d at 1009.
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ment between the, insured and the insurer excusing both parties
from the insurance contract successfully will invoke the doctrine.1 18 Thus, an insured's own unwitting actions cannot lead to
an unintended cancellation of the policy. This result stands in
sharp contrast to the holding in Sizelove. Applying the Sizelove
standard, an insured's actions which disclosed an intent to cancel
could lead to cancellation.
C.

Notification of Cancellation to Certificate Holder

The Illinois Appellate Court for the Fourth District addressed
the effectiveness of an insurer's attempt to cancel a policy when the
insurer notified the insured but failed to notify the certificate
holder in Smith v. Richard.1 9 In Smith, the court held that the
cancellation was ineffective because the policy required notification
of cancellation to be given to the certificate holder as well as to the
insured. 120

In Smith, the plaintiff filed a personal injury action based upon
the defendant's alleged negligent operation of a van.' I' At the time
of the accident, the defendant was delivering mail pursuant to a
subcontract with the United States Postal Service.' 22 As required
by the subcontract, the defendant Richard had obtained a public
liability insurance policy from State Farm. Consequently, the
plaintiff amended his complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment
against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
("State Farm") to determine coverage for the accident. 23 Previously, State Farm had sent a certificate of insurance to the Postal
Service indicating that Richard's coverage had been increased.' 24
The certificate provided that the "endorsement [was] part of your
policy."'" 2 Later, when Richard failed to meet premium payments,
State Farm notified Richard that the policy had been cancelled
but
26
failed to notify the Postal Service of the cancellation.
On appeal, the court held that the certificate issued by State
Farm to the Postal Service placed State Farm under an obligation
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
134 Ill.
App. 3d 378, 480
Id. at 382-83, 480 N.E.2d
Id. at 380-81, 480 N.E.2d
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 382, 480 N.E.2d at
Id. at 382, 480 N.E.2d at

N.E.2d 859 (4th Dist. 1985).
at 862.
at 860-61.

861.
862.
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to inform the Postal Service of a cancellation of the policy.' 27 The
premiums paid by Richard constituted consideration for the
promises to the Postal Service as contained in the certificate. 28 Because State Farm had breached its promise to notify the Postal
Service of policy cancellation, its cancellation of the policy based
on Richard's nonpayment of premiums was ineffective. 129 Public
policy also supported the court's decision because the policy itself
was required to protect the public from uninsured drivers. 30
IV.
A.

THE INSURER'S CONDUCT

The Duty of Good Faith Conduct

The Survey year yielded a number of appellate court decisions
delineating the scope of an insurer's duty to deal in good faith with
its insured. For example, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District considered whether an insurer has a duty to notify an additional insured of a settlement between the underlying plaintiff
and the named insured in Pekin Insurance Co. v. Home Insurance
Co..I'' The Pekin court held that an insurer's failure to notify the
additional insured, in this instance a co-insured employer, did not
insured's position had
constitute bad faith because the additional
1 32
not been altered by the settlement.
In Pekin, a Chicago White Sox employee was involved in an
auto accident while conducting White Sox business. 133 The employee had been insured under a liability policy issued by Pekin.
An omnibus provision of the policy named the White Sox as an
additional insured,1 34 while Home Insurance Company ("Home")
insured the White Sox in a separate policy. Pekin obtained a covenant not to sue from a party injured in the accident in return for
$25,000, the full limit of Pekin's policy.1 35 This release did not
apply to the White Sox and was obtained without notice to either
the White Sox or Home. 36 Home tendered the defense of the subsequent suit against the White Sox to Pekin. Pekin indicated that it
127. Id. at 382-83, 480 N.E.2d at 862.
128. Id. at 382, 480 N.E.2d at 862.
129. Id. at 383, 480 N.E.2d at 862.
130. Id.
131. 134 IM.App. 3d 31, 479 N.E.2d 1078 (1st Dist. 1985). See supra notes 81-84 and
accompanying text.
132. Pekin, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 34, 479 N.E.2d at 1081.
133. Id. at 32, 479 N.E.2d at 1079-80.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 32, 479 N.E.2d at 1080.
136. Id.
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would retain counsel for the action but reserved its rights regarding
any obligation to indemnify the Sox because the policy limits already had been exhausted by the settlement. 1 37 Home rejected this
defense, contending that Pekin had breached its duty to deal in
good faith with the White
Sox as an additional insured to the pol38
icy with its employee.
The Pekin court held that Pekin's actions in obtaining the release without notice to the White Sox did not constitute bad
faith. 39 The court determined that the White Sox position had not
been altered by the release because any judgment against them
would have been reduced by the settlement amount.'I As a result,
with or without the release, the White Sox would have been liable
only for damages greater than the policy limit.' 4 ' Furthermore,
the court emphasized that Pekin was not actively representing the
White Sox in the underlying litigation at the time of the settlement.' 42 Thus, the appellate court concluded that the White Sox
had failed to prove any bad faith by Pekin. Moreover, Pekin had
fulfilled its obligation to the
White Sox by offering to defend under
43
a reservation of rights.
Another aspect of the insurer's good faith conduct addressed
during the Survey year was the insurer's duty to provide the insured with sufficient information to enable him to convert his
group life insurance policy to an individual policy. In Donnelly v.
Washington NationalInsurance Co.,'I" the Illinois Appellate Court
for the First District defined these duties. The court decided that
failure to provide this information breached the insurer's good
faith duty to its insured. 4
In Donnelly, the children of the insured, Donnelly, sued the insurer, Washington National, for failure to pay a life insurance
claim. Donnelly was covered by his employer's group life and
group health policies with Washington National. Provisions in the
policies allowed them to be converted to individual policies during6
4
a thirty-one day period after the termination of employment.
The trial court found that Donnelly had contacted Washington
137. Id. at 32-33, 479 N.E.2d at 1080.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 34, 479 N.E.2d at 1081.
140. Id.
141. Pekin, 134 Ill. App. 3d at 34, 479 N.E.2d at 1081.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 34-35, 479 N.E.2d at 1081.
144. 136 Ill. App. 3d 78, 482 N.E.2d 424 (1st Dist. 1985).
145. Id. at 87-88, 482 N.E.2d at 432.
146. Id. at 80-82, 482 N.E.2d at 427-28.
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National's agent during the conversion period and had requested
the necessary forms for conversion, but Washington National had
failed to send Donnelly the requested materials to effect the conversion.147 The appellate court affirmed the trial court ruling that
Washington National's actions constituted a breach of its good
faith duty, and consequently excused Donnelly's failure to sign the
application and pay the premium for conversion. 4 8 Significantly,
the court determined that while the duty of good faith had been
breached, Washington National's omission did not constitute vexatious conduct. The court in Donnelly thus established that a violation of good faith does not necessarily constitute vexatious
conduct. 149
The courts in Pekin and Donnelly adopted opposing positions in
construing the insurer's duty of good faith. The Pekin decision
narrows the scope of that duty, while the Donnelly holding, on the
other hand, greatly expands that duty.
The Pekin decision implicitly holds that an insurer need not notify an additional insured of a settlement affecting the policy's indemnity limits. The holding narrows the scope of the good faith
duty because the indemnity funds available to an additional insured are potentially decreased by such settlements. Under the peculiar facts of Pekin, however, there was no effect on the additional
insured's indemnity funds. By holding that an insurer need not
notify the additional insured of these settlements, the Pekin decision relaxes the insurer's duty to keep additional insureds informed
of settlement proceedings which affect indemnity limits.
The Donnelly case, however, extends the insurer's duty to supply
its insured with information. Donnelly obligates the insurer to provide the necessary information to convert a group policy to an individual policy when the insured requested the information and the
insurer promised delivery.1 50 Conceivably, the Donnelly principle
could be applied to every situation in which an insured requested
information to convert coverage, including requests to increase
coverage limits or requests to add a particular risk to a policy. The
Donnelly court left undecided the length of allowable delay by an
147. Id. at 82, 87, 482 N.E.2d at 428, 431.
148. Id. at 87-88, 482 N.E.2d at 432.
149. Id. at 90-91, 482 N.E.2d at 433.
150. Id. The apparent underlying rationale of this decision is to eliminate the risk of
insureds who request such information and then face a considerable delay in receiving it.
Because the insurer's inaction leaves the insured without the coverage requested, such
coverage is implied, and the insurer bears the burden caused by its own inaction and
delay.
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insurer faced with a request for such information before coverage
might be implied.
B.

Insurer's Vexatious Conduct

During the Survey year, the appellate court decided two significant decisions involving a provision of the Illinois Insurance Code
(the "Code") which allows an insured to recover reasonable attorney's fees and up to $25,000 for vexatious conduct by insurance
companies in handling claims.151 The appellate court held that the
fees provision preempted an action for punitive damages against an
insurer in Kaniuk v. Safeco Insurance Co.. 152
In Kaniuk, the insured sought one million dollars in exemplary
damages for the insurer's bad faith conduct.1" 3 The insurer defended on the grounds that section 155 of the Illinois Insurance
Code preempted this cause of action."5 4
The appellate court rejected the insured's argument that the earlier cases establishing preemption'55 failed to apply the proper rule
of statutory construction. 156 Instead, the Kaniuk court held that
the section precluded a common law action because it contained
negative words that rendered it exclusive. 15 7 The court noted that
the relevant provision of the Code allows a plaintiff to recover an
amount "not to exceed" a specified amount for an insurer's vexatious conduct.'5 "
Kaniuk adheres to a long line of appellate cases which have held
that section 155 preempts the common law award of punitive damages against insurers."5 9 The Illinois Supreme Court has yet to accept one of these cases for review. Interestingly, however, the
leading appellate case which has construed section 155 as not pre151. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 767 (1985).
152. 142 Ill. App. 3d 1070, 492 N.E.2d 592 (1st Dist. 1986).
153. Id. at 1071, 492 N.E.2d at 592.
154. Id.
155. See Kinney v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 294, 458 N.E.2d 79
(1st Dist. 1983); Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 Ill. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (2d
Dist. 1980); Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1st Dist.
1979).
156. Kaniuk, 142 IlL. App. 3d at 1072, 492 N.E.2d at 593.
157. Id. at 1073, 492 N.E.2d at 594 (citing Kosick v. S.A. Healy Co., 380 Ill. 298,
302, 44 N.E.2d 27, 30 (1942)).
158. Kaniuk, 142 Ill. App. 3d at 1073, 492 N.E.2d at 594 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
73, para. 767 (1985)).
159. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Allstate Ins. Co., 85 Il. App. 3d 631, 407 N.E.2d 156 (1st
Dist. 1980); Tobolt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 75 Ill. App. 3d 57, 393 N.E.2d 1171 (1st Dist.
1979); Urfer v. Country Mutual Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App. 3d 469, 376 N.E.2d 1073 (4th Dist.
1978); Debolt v. Mutual of Omaha, 56 II1. App. 3d 111, 371 N.E.2d 373 (3d Dist. 1978).
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empting the field, Ledingham v. Blue Cross Planfor Hospital Care
of Hospital Service Corp.160 was cited with approval in the Illinois
Supreme Court decision of Kelsay v. Motorola.1 61 None of the appellate holdings in line with Kaniuk have discussed the arguable
approval of Ledingham by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Hall v. Svea Mutual Insurance Co.162 presented another question
regarding interpretation of section 155 of the Illinois Insurance
Code. The Hall court confronted the question of whether a finding
of vexatious conduct by the insurer necessitates an award of the
full amount of the insured's attorney's fees. The Illinois Appellate
Court for the Third District
held that the section mandated a full
163
award of attorney's fees.

In Hall, the insured prevailed on a section 155 action for unreasonable conduct against the insurer. 16 The trial court, however,
neither awarded the full amount of the insured's attorney's fees nor
awarded punitive damages. 6 ' On appeal, the insured argued that
the court erred in failing to award full attorney's fees and punitive
damages. 166
The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision on the issue of attorney's fees, finding that the purpose of section 155 was to
discourage bad faith denials of coverage and that this purpose
would not be furthered if the protection afforded by section 155
was reduced by the insured's bearing of litigation costs. 167 The

court, however, affirmed the failure to award any punitive damages
68
because such an award fell within the the trial court's discretion. 1
Hall thus establishes that a finding of vexatious and unreasonable
conduct against an insurer does not in itself necessitate an assessment of punitive damages.
V.

UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE

Uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage policies provide
coverage to motorists who are involved in accidents with motorists
who are either uninsured or whose insurance coverage limits fail to
provide full compensation to the injured motorist. Insurers are re160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

29 Il. App. 3d 339, 330 N.E.2d 540 (5th Dist. 1975).
74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
143 Ill. App. 3d 809, 493 N.E.2d 1102 (3d Dist. 1986).
Id. at 811, 493 N.E.2d at 1105.
Id. at 810, 493 N.E.2d at 1104.
Id. at 810-11, 493 N.E.2d at 1104.
Id. at 811, 493 N.E.2d at 1104.
Id.
Id. at 813, 493 N.E.2d at 1105-06.

Insurance Law

1986]

quired by statute to offer this coverage to all their insured motorists. 169 The requirements of this "offer" and other issues related to
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage were the subject of
several decisions during the Survey year.
A.

Insurer'sDuty of Good Faith Representation
Insurers were held to a duty of good faith when making representations of coverage in Glazewski v. Coronet Insurance Co..170
The Illinois Supreme Court in Glazewski held that an insurer who
holds out a policy in return for a premium tacitly represents that
the coverage has value. 7 ' Therefore, the plaintiff successfully had
stated a cause of action for fraud because he alleged that the coverage he received had no value.172
In Glazewski, the plaintiffs brought a class action against a
number of insurance companies, alleging fraud and a violation of
the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act"' arising from the sale
of underinsured motorist coverage.' 7 4 The plaintiffs argued that
the coverage had no value due to the statutory definition of
75
"underinsured."1

The supreme court determined that the plaintiff had successfully
stated a cause of action for fraud. 17 6 The court held that the plaintiffs had alleged false representations by the insurance companies, 177 reasoning that the issuance of an insurance policy in return
for a premium constituted a tacit representation that the policy
had value. 178 Because a plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be
true for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the court assumed that
169. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2 (1985).
170. 108 Ill. 2d 243, 250, 483 N.E.2d 1263, 1266 (1985).
171. Id. at 250, 483 N.E.2d at 1266.
172. Id.
173. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121'/2, para. 311-317 (1985).
174. Glazewski, 108 Ill. 2d at 246, 483 N.E.2d at 1264. Insurance companies are required to offer uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage under section 143a-2 of the
Illinois Insurance Code. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2 (1985).
175. Glazewski, 108 Ill. 2d at 247, 483 N.E.2d at 1264. The limits provided by the
policies were $15,000 per person and $30,000 per occurrence. Id. at 246, 483 N.E.2d at
1264. The Illinois Insurance Code provides that the liability limit of an insurer providing
underinsured motorist coverage would be the limits of the policy less the amount recovered on applicable insurance policies on the vehicle. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a2(3) (1985). The minimal coverage in Illinois, however, had been raised to the same
$15,000 and $30,000 limits. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 951/2, paras. 7-203, 7-317(b)(3) (1985).
Thus, plaintiffs argued, no policy holder could ever recover following an accident with an
Illinois resident. Glazewski, 108 Ill. 2d at 248-49, 483 N.E.2d at 1265.
176. Glazewski, 108 I11.2d at 254, 483 N.E.2d at 1268.
177. Id. at 250, 483 N.E.2d at 1266.
178. Id.
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the coverage had no value, as alleged in the complaint.179 Accordingly, a false representation had been made and a cause of action
for fraud stated. Additionally, the court noted that failure of the
Director of Insurance to discontinue the coverage did not authorize the insurance company to offer and sell the policies in a misleading manner. 180
Under the Glazewski holding, each time an insurer issues a policy in return for a premium, it represents that the policy has value.
Accordingly, an insured need only allege that the policy has no
value in order to survive an insurer's motion to dismiss based on
failure to state a cause of action for fraud.
B.

"Offer" Defined

In Cloninger v. National General Insurance Co., 181 the Illinois
Supreme Court addressed for the first time the issue of what constitutes a proper "offer" of underinsured motorist coverage as re1 2
quired by section 143a-2(3) of the Illinois Insurance Code.
Cloninger had received a $16,000 settlement for injuries suffered in
an automobile accident, an amount representing the limit on his
driver's coverage. 8 3 Although Cloninger's policy did not expressly
provide underinsured motorist coverage, Cloninger sought a declaration that underinsured coverage was implied at law because National General Insurance Co. ("National General") had failed to
make an adequate offer of the coverage.' 84 The trial court held
that the offer had been inadequate, and the appellate court
85
affirmed. 1
In upholding the appellate court ruling, the supreme court noted
that an insured also had the right to elect or reject underinsured
motorist coverage. 86 In order to exercise this right, the insured
must have information regarding the coverage."8 7 Therefore, an
"offer" of coverage pursuant to section 143a-2(3) must provide the
insured sufficient information to decide intelligently whether to
179. Id.
180. Id. at 251, 483 N.E.2d at 1266.
181. 109 Ill.
2d 419, 488 N.E.2d 548 (1985).
182. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2(3) (1985). The Code requires insurance
companies to "offer" underinsured motorist coverage to its policyholders. Id.
183. Cloninger, 109 Il.2d at 421, 488 N.E.2d at 548.
184. Id. at 422, 488 N.E.2d at 548.
185. Id. at 423, 488 N.E.2d at 549.
186. Id. at 424, 488 N.E.2d at 550 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 755a-2(4)
(1985)).
187. Cloninger, 109 Ill. 2d at 424-25, 488 N.E.2d at 550 (citing Tucker v. Country
Mut. Ins. Co., 125 ill.
App. 3d 329, 465 N.E.2d 956 (4th Dist. 1984)).

1986]

Insurance Law

elect such coverage."'
In determining the amount of information necessary for a proper
offer, the court relied on the Minnesota decision of Hastings v.
United Pacific Insurance Co.,'19 a case interpreting a similar "offer" provision. Hastings delineated four requirements for a valid
offer: (1)notification of the offer must be commercially reasonable;
(2)specification of the limits of the optional coverage; (3)intelligible
communication to the insured of the nature of the option; and
(4)notification to the insured that the optional coverage is available
for relatively modest premium increases. 190
In applying this test to the facts before it, the Cloninger court
held that National General's offer failed the third prong of the
test.' 91 Though National General's offer contained a list of premi92
ums and limits, it failed to explain the nature of the coverage.'
Cloninger, however, left unclear what limit of coverage could be
implied in situations of inadequate offers. Logsdon v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co. 193 presented the Illinois Appellate Court for the
Third District with this related issue. In Logsdon, the insured had
never received any offer of underinsured motorist coverage. 194 In
addressing the limits of coverage to be implied, the court held that
section 143-2a(3) provided no limit. 195 The court further held that
the limit of underinsured motorist coverage to be implied by law
was the maximum amount of bodily injury liability coverage being
offered by the insurer for the last renewal period prior to the injury. 196 The court noted that the Cloninger decision supported this
188. Cloninger, 109 Ill. 2d at 425, 488 N.E.2d at 550.
189. 318 N.W.2d 849 (Minn. 1982).
190. Cloninger, 109 I11.2d at 425-26, 488 N.E.2d at 550.
191. Id. at 428, 488 N.E.2d at 551.
192. Id. at 427-28, 488 N.E.2d at 551. The Cloninger court noted, however, that an
explanation of coverage similar to that accepted in Orolin v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 585 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ill. 1984), would have fulfilled the requirement. Cloninger,
109 Ill. 2d at 428, 488 N.E.2d at 551. The Orolin court stated:
The court is further convinced that the language of Hartford's stuffer sufficiently offered underinsured motorist coverage to Orolin. The stuffer makes the
insured aware of the limits of liability that may be purchased. It provides examples of accidents for which coverage would be provided and affirmatively recommends the coverage. Finally, it states that an agent can provide information
concerning coverages, cost and choices available to an insured. This is, as a
matter of law, information sufficient for an insured to make an intelligent decision with respect to optional coverage.
Orolin, 585 F. Supp. at 101-102.
193. 143 Ill. App. 3d 957, 493 N.E.2d 748 (3d Dist. 1986).
194. Id. at 961, 493 N.E.2d at 751.
195. Id. at 962, 493 N.E.2d at 752.
196. Id. at 964, 493 N.E.2d at 753.
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result. 197
Subsequently, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First District
decided that section 143a-2 did not require an insurer to make an
offer of uninsured motorist coverage when an insured adds a new
car to an existing policy. In Makela v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,198 the court asserted that this holding was
supported by the decisions of other jurisdictions. 99 Furthermore,
the court stated that an addition of an automobile to an existing
policy constituted a renewal or supplementary policy, and section
143a-2 did not require offers for such policies. 2 o
C. Physical Contact as a Condition Precedent to Recovery
Lemke v. Kenilworth Insurance Co. 20 1 presented the Illinois
Supreme Court an opportunity to reconsider a previous ruling regarding the requirement of physical contact in uninsured motorist
coverage policies.2 °2 The court reaffirmed its holding in Ferega v.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ,203 and held that a
requirement of physical contact as a condition precedent to recovan uninsured motorist policy did not violate public
ery under
2 °4
policy.
In Lemke, the plaintiff failed to allege physical contact in her
complaint against her insurer, Kenilworth. 20 5 Lemke sought to
have Ferega overruled by arguing that the physical contact provision ran contrary to the remedial goal of section 143a-2 because it
limited the potential for recovery.2 °6
The court rejected this argument in reaffirming Ferega.2 °7 The
Lemke court noted that since the 1974 Ferega decision, the legisla197. Id. at 963-64, 493 N.E.2d at 753.
198. 147 Ill. App. 3d 38, 49, 497 N.E.2d 483, 490 (1st Dist. 1986).
199. Id. at 45-46, 497 N.E.2d at 488. See, e.g., American Fire & Indem. Co. v.
Spaulding, 442 So. 2d 206 (Fla. 1983); E1-Habr v. Mountain States Casualty Co., 626
S.W.2d 171 (Tex. App. 1981); Myers v. Thibeaux, 365 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 1978); Hicks
v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 568 P.2d 629 (Okla. 1977).
200. Id. at 49-50, 497 N.E.2d at 490-91.
201. 109 Ill. 2d 350, 487 N.E.2d 943 (1985).
202. Id. at 353-54, 487 N.E.2d at 945.
203. 58 Ill. 2d 109, 317 N.E.2d 550 (1974).
204. Lemke, 109 Ill. 2d at 354, 487 N.E.2d at 945.
205. Id. at 352, 487 N.E.2d at 944-45. Lemke's complaint alleged that she had been
forced to veer off the road by an unidentified, unapprehended vehicle. Lemke failed to
preserve for appeal an amended count alleging contact. Id. at 352, 487 N.E.2d at 944.
206. Id. at 354, 487 N.E.2d at 945. The remedial goal, asserted the plaintiff, was to
ensure coverage of claims by drivers involved in accidents with "hit-and-run" or "phantom" motorists. Id.
207. Id.

19861

Insurance Law

ture had amended section 143a eight times without dispensing with
Ferega's judicially imposed physical contact requirement. 28 Because the court believed the legislature was familiar with Ferega, it
interpreted legislative inaction subsequent to that decision as an
approval of that decision's reasoning and holding. 2°
During the Survey year, the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District addressed the related issue of indirect physical contact
under the physical contact requirements in Yutkin v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co.. 2 ° In Yutkin, the evidence showed that

the plaintiff's car had been struck by a piece of tire retread left on
the road.21

No witnesses, however, observed either the retread

leaving another vehicle or any other explanation of its presence on
the road.212
In denying coverage, the court held that when indirect physical
contact occurs, the Ferega physical contact requirement mandates
a causal connection which constitutes a substantial nexus between
the hit-and-run vehicle and the intermediate object.2"' The Yutkin
court noted that the causal connection requirement minimizes the
possibilities of fraud. 214 Furthermore, the court held that the intermediate object must be transmitted to the claimant's vehicle by "a
force which is continuous and contemporaneous. '"215 In Yutkin,

the court asserted that any causal connection was too attenuated.
The Yutkin decision thus establishes that the physical contact requirement precludes recovery for accidents caused by debris
strewn in the road.
Lemke and Yutkin, by upholding the physical contact requirements, greatly diminish the potential for fraud in uninsured motorist claims. Without the contact requirement, the difficulties of
handling the so-called "phantom" hit-and-run vehicle, which triggers uninsured motorist coverage, would become even greater.
VI.

SPOUSAL HEALTH INSURANCE REFORM ACT

Passed into law during the Survey year, the Spousal Health Insurance Reform Act ("SHIRA" or the "Act") 2 "6 became effective
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id.
Id.
146 Ill. App. 3d 953, 497 N.E.2d 471 (1st Dist. 1986).
Id. at 954, 497 N.E.2d at 472.
Id.
Id. at 956, 497 N.E.2d at 473.
Yutkin, 146 Ill.
App. 3d at 955, 497 N.E.2d at 472.
Id. at 956, 497 N.E.2d at 473.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 979.2 (1985).
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December 1, 1985. Under SHIRA, an individual can elect to retain a former spouse's health insurance by paying all the required
premiums, including any amounts normally contributed by the
spouse's employer. 2 17 The Act applies to both widowed and di-

vorced spouses, but affects only renewed policies or new group
health insurance programs effective after December 1, 1985.218
Persons choosing to continue coverage under SHIRA can do so for
up to two years if they are under age fifty-five at the time coverage
begins. If they are over fifty-five, they may continue coverage until
they qualify for Medicare benefits. 2 9
SHIRA generally is considered as a victory by women's organizations because it provides needed health insurance to widows and
divorcees at a period when their financial conditions are generally
poor. Before passage of the Act, insurers often allowed the spouse
to convert the remaining group policy to individual coverage, but
the resulting coverage often proved to be far less comprehensive
though sold at a higher premium. The act now provides a measure
of protection for those faced with the loss of their spouse's health
coverage by reason of death or divorce.22 °
VII.

CONCLUSION

While many important issues were resolved during the Survey
year, the resolution of insurance coverage in asbestos cases undoubtedly shall prove the most far-reaching. Additionally, the Illinois courts made noteworthy advances in defining conflict of
interest situations arising between an insurer and its insured. Decisions involving the insurers' conduct in dealing with their clients
further refined the insurers' duties. Finally, several questions concerning uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage were resolved by the Illinois Supreme Court.

217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. For a more detailed discussion of SHIRA, see the Family Law article within this
Survey issue.

